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BENCHMARK PROBLEMS FOR TOTALLY UNIMODULAR SET
SYSTEM AUCTION
ILAN ADLER ∗ AND DORIT S. HOCHBAUM †
Abstract. We consider a generalization of the k-flow set system auction where the set to be
procured by a customer corresponds to a feasible solution to a linear programming problem where the
coefficient matrix and right-hand-side together constitute a totally unimodular matrix. Our results
generalize and strengthen bounds identified for several benchmarks, which form a crucial component
in the study of frugality ratios of truthful auction mechanisms.
1. Introduction. In a set system auction, a customer procure the services of a
subset of a set of available agents, each of whom quotes a specific amount (called a
bid) for the service. The customer must select from predetermined feasible subsets of
the agents, while minimizing total payments to the agents.
Several authors ([KKT05, CEGP10, CK07, GC10, KSM10]) have considered vari-
ants of set system auction problems in which the feasible sets are defined in the context
of networks where nodes or edges represent agents and the feasible sets are charac-
terized by network structures such as spanning trees; single and multi-paths; vertex
covers and cuts . An auction mechanism determines a selection scheme – that is, how
to decide on the set of winning agents, and how much to pay each of the winning
agents, although the mechanism can devise prices different from the bid values of
the agents. A desirable property of the mechanism is that is should be designed to
be truthful so that agents have no incentive to lie about their true cost of providing
service while quoting their bids.
This truthfulness feature results in premium payments to the agents that exceeds
the agents’ truthful bids, similar to the single agent case where the agent with the
winning bid can raise her bid up to the second lowest bid without affecting her position.
A key goal in designing auction mechanism is to minimize the additional costs to the
customer resulting from seeking truthful bids. A major theme within this stream of
research focuses on the notion of frugality that was introduced in [AT02] and extended
by [T03]. The frugality ratio measures the ratio of the payments made by a truthful
auction mechanism as compared to some benchmark which is intended to represent the
least cost auction mechanism that assures truthful biding. In [EGG07], two frequently
discussed benchmarks related to bids satisfying Nash equilibrium within the context
of several set auctions related to networks are analyzed. Both problems are defined as
optimization problems which share the same set of constraints and objective. In the
first benchmark problem, which was introduced in [KSM10], the objective function
is minimized, while in the second problem, which was introduced in [EGG07], the
objective function is maximized.
Two recent papers, [CEGP10] and [KSM10], present and discuss set auctions in
which the feasible subset corresponds to k disjoint s − t paths, which can be found
by solving a min cost k-flow problem (and thus the corresponding auction problem is
commonly called the k-flow auction problem). In particular, they prove several results
related to the two benchmark problems (associated with the k-flow auction problem)
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as discussed above. Our goal in this paper is to present a generalization of the k-flow
auction problem to a linear programming (LP) problem whose coefficient matrix and
right-hand-side together constitute a totally unimodular matrix. In particular, in this
more general setting, we provide novel simple proofs based on standard LP theory
for (and extend in one case) all the bounds related to the two associated benchmark
problems.
1.1. Contributions. Specifically, we propose a set system auction framework
that generalizes the k-flow auction problem. The feasible sets are defined in terms of
a partition of the columns of a totally unimodular matrix.
We denote by µ(k) (ν(k)) the optimal objective function value of the maximiza-
tion (minimization) benchmark problem. The formal definition of these benchmark
problems is given in Section 3. In [CEGP10], it is proved that for the k-flow auction
problem µ(k) ≥ k[φ(k+1)−φ(k)]. We prove that this inequality is in fact an equality
for the k-flow auction problem, and the equality applies in the more general setting
of total unimodularity.
Both [KSM10] and [CEGP10] present a pruned k-flow auction problem which
plays a key rule in analyzing the associated frugality ratios. Specifically, the pruned k-
flow auction problem is defined as a restriction on the k-flow auction problem in which
all edges who are not in the min cost solution of the original k-flow auction problem are
removed. We denote by µ˜(k) the optimal objective function value of the maximization
benchmark problem associated with the pruned problem. The precise definition of the
pruned problem is given in Section 3.1. For the k-flow auction problem, it is proved
in [KSM10] that µ(k) ≥ 1
k+1 µ˜(k), while it is proved in [CEGP10] that µ(k) ≥ µ˜(k).
We prove, for the more general case of total unimodularity, the same lower bound for
µ(k) as in [CEGP10]. We also provide an upper bound for µ(k) in terms of µ˜(k).
[CEGP10] presents a lower bound for ν(k). The key to this bound is a theorem,
first introduced in [GC10], related to a minimum cost k-flow problem with the property
that removing any single edge from the underlying network does not affect the total
minimum cost. We present a simpler proof of this theorem generalized to totally
unimodular matrices. We then proceed to use this theorem to prove a lower bound
for ν(k), which generalizes a similar bound established in [CEGP10] for the k-flow
case.
1.2. Notation and Preliminaries. Matrices are denoted by boldface, upper
case fonts, e.g. A. Vectors are denoted by boldface, lower case fonts, e.g. v.
For an n ×m matrix A, let J = {1, . . . , n} be the set of columns of the matrix.
Let J ′ ⊆ J then AJ′ indicates the |J
′| ×m submatrix of A restricted to the set of
columns J ′. Similarly, xJ′ indicates a restriction of the vector x ∈ R
n to a |J ′|-vector.
2. First Price Set System Auction Problem. In the first price set system
auction each agent bids her true cost and the customer selects a feasible set with min-
imum total cost. Specifically: given an m×n matrix A, an m vector b, a nonnegative
n vector c, and a positive integer k, the goal is to find k mutually exclusive subsets
J1, . . . , Jk of {1, . . . , n} whose total cost is minimized. That is:
min
k∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ji
cj(2.1)
subject to
∑
j∈Ji
Aj = b, i = 1, . . . , k.
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We assume throughout the paper that the matrix (A,b) is totally unimodular
and that b 6= 0. We show below that under these assumptions, it is possible to present
problem (2.1) as the following linear program:
P(k) : φ(k) = min cx
subject to Ax = kb, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
where k is a positive integer, c is a row vector, b,x are column vectors, (A,b) is
totally unimodular, and b 6= 0.
The k-flow set auction problem, which is discussed in detail in [KSM10] and
[CEGP10], is a special case of P(k). Specifically, given a directed graph G with an
origin node s, a sink node t, and a capacity 1 for each edge, we can set A as the
node-edge incidence matrix of G and b as a vector of zeros with the exception of 1
in the row corresponding to s and −1 in the row corresponding to t. The resulting
matrix, (A,b), is totally unimodular.
The total unimodularity of A guarantees that an integer (and thus a binary)
optimal solution to P(k) exists whenever b is an integer vector and the problem is
feasible. The decomposition of this solution to k binary feasible solutions to P(1), as
required by (2.1), is possible due to the following proposition, which is a variant of
the integral decomposition property theorem of Baum and Trotter [BT78].
Proposition 2.1. Let x¯ be a binary feasible solution to P(k). Then, there exist
k binary feasible solutions x¯1, . . . , x¯k to P(1) such that x¯ =
∑k
i=1 x¯
i.
Proof. The proof follows by induction. The case k = 1 is trivial. Suppose the
proposition is true for k− 1 ≥ 2. Let J = {j | x¯j = 1}. Since
1
k
x¯ is a feasible solution
to P(1) and since A is totally unimodular, there exists a binary vector xk such that
AJx
k
J = b. Let xˆ = x¯− x
k. Then,
Axˆ = A(x¯ − xk) = kb− b = (k − 1)b, 0 ≤ xˆ ≤ 1, xˆ is binary.
By the induction assumption, there exist k− 1 binary vectors xˆi, i = 1, . . . , k− 1
such that xˆ =
∑k
i=1 xˆ
i and for each i, xˆi is a feasible solution to P(1). Letting x¯i = xˆi
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, and x¯k = xk completes the proof.
It will be useful to consider P(λ) for real nonnegative parameter value λ. In this
case, we can present the problem as a parametric linear program as follows:
P(λ) : φ(λ) = min cx
subject to Ax = 0+ λb, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
(2.2)
It is well known that the function φ(λ) is a continuous piecewise linear convex. In
addition, if the problem has an optimal solution for at least one parameter value λ,
there exist break points λ0, λ1, . . . , λℓ and hi, gi real numbers i = 1, . . . , ℓ, such that,
P(λ) is feasible for λ ∈ [λ0, λℓ],(2.3)
φ(λ) = hi + giλ for λi−1 ≤ λ ≤ λi, i = 1, . . . , ℓ.(2.4)
And, since the matrix (A,b) is totally unimodular,
all the break points λi are integers.(2.5)
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We assume, by introducing lexicographical ordering of the variables if necessary,
that P(k) has a unique optimal solution x∗. We also assume that P(k) is monopoly-
free. That is, for every j = 1, . . . , n, there exists a feasible solution x to P(k) with
xj = 0. This property, as demonstrated in the next proposition, implies that there
exists a feasible solution to P(k + 1).
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that for every j = 1, . . . , n, P(k) has a feasible
solution x¯j with x¯jj = 0. Then, there exists a feasible solution to P(k + 1).
Proof. Let x¯ = 1
n
∑n
j=1 x¯
j . Then, since x¯ is a strict convex combination of feasible
solutions to P(k), and since x¯jj = 0 for every j = 1, . . . , n, we have that x¯ is a feasible
solution to P(k) and that 0 ≤ x¯ < 1. Hence, there exists a sufficiently small positive
ǫ¯ such that for λ ∈ [k, (1 + ǫ¯)k],
(
λ
k
)
x¯ is a feasible solution to P(λ). Recalling that
by (2.5), all the breakpoints λi of φ(λ) in the parametric LP (2.2) are integers, and
considering (2.3), we have that P(k + 1) is feasible.
Throughout the rest of the paper we make frequent use of the optimality conditions
of P(λ) that are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. Let x¯ = (x¯J0 , x¯Jf , x¯J1), where x¯J0 = 0, 0 < x¯Jf < 1, and
x¯J1 = 1, be a feasible solution to P(λ). Then, x¯ is optimal if, and only if, there exists
an m-row vector y¯ such that,
y¯AJ0 ≤ cJ0 , y¯AJf = cJf , y¯AJ1 ≥ cJ1 .
In addition, φ(λ) = cx¯ = λy¯b+ (cJ1 − y¯AJ1)1.
Proof. The proof follows directly by setting the dual problem to P(k) and impos-
ing the complementary slackness conditions.
3. Benchmark Problems. We associate two benchmark problems with P(k).
Let x∗ be the unique optimal solution to P(k), and let
J0 = {j | x
∗
j = 0}, J1 = {j | x
∗
j = 1}.
In both benchmark problems, we consider changing the prices cj to zj while satisfying
the following requirements (where the decision variables form a row n-vector z):
zJ1 ≥ cJ1 , zJ0 = cJ0 ,(3.1)
zx∗ ≤ zx¯ for every binary feasible solution x¯ to P(k),(3.2)
For every j = 1, . . . , n, there exists a binary feasible solution x¯j to P(k)(3.3)
such that x¯jj = 0 and zx
∗ = zx¯j . .
The two benchmark problems share the same objective function zJ1x
∗
J1
, but differ
by whether to maximize or minimize it (note that since x∗J1 = 1, we can refer to the
objective function as zJ11). In the max benchmark problem, Bmax(k) that was first
introduced in [EGG07], the objective is to maximize the objective function, while
the objective in the min benchmark problem, Bmin(k) that was first introduced in
[KKT05], is to minimize the objective function. We denote the optimal objective
value of the max benchmark problem by µ(k), and the optimal objective value of the
min benchmark problem by ν(k).
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3.1. The Max Benchmark Problem. As was pointed out in [EGG07], and
can easily be verified, any optimal solution to the max benchmark problem satisfies
the requirement stated in (3.3). Therefore, if a separation oracle for condition (3.2)
is provided, the max benchmark problem can be formulated as a linear program.
In [KSM10] and [CEGP10], the max benchmark problem for the special case of k-
flow is analyzed by using elaborate network theory results. In contrast, by considering
Proposition 2.3, we present an explicit LP formulation of the max benchmark problem
for the more general case as presented in (2.1). We then proceed, by using standard LP
theory, to provide simpler proofs that generalize the results in [KSM10] and [CEGP10].
Applying directly the optimality conditions of Proposition 2.3, and considering
requirements (3.1) and (3.2), the max benchmark problem can be formulated as the
following linear program:
Bmax(k) : µ(k) = max zJ11
subject to yAJ0 ≤ cJ0
yAJ1 ≥ zJ1
zJ1 ≥ cJ1
In [CEGP10], it is proved that for the k-flow problem, µ(k) ≥ k[φ(k+1)− φ(k)].
In the following theorem we prove that this inequality is in fact an equality even in
the more general case of total unimodularity.
Theorem 3.1. µ(k) = k[φ(k + 1)− φ(k)].
Proof. Observing that at optimality, yAJ1 = zJ1 , and that AJ11 = kb, Bmax(k)
can be written as:
µ(k) = max
y∈Y(k)
kyb = kβ(k),
where
Y(k) = {y | yAJ0 ≤ cJ0 , yAJ1 ≥ cJ1}, and β(k) = max
y∈Y(k)
yb.
Considering P(k) as a parametric LP as in (2.2), noting that Y(k) is the set of all
optimal solutions to the dual of P(k), and applying a well known result about paramet-
ric LP (see e.g. Theorem 8.2 of [M83]), we have that β(k) = gi, where λi−1 ≤ k < λi.
However, since by (2.5) the breakpoints λi are all integers, gi = φ(k+1)−φ(k), which
implies that µ(k) = kβ(k) = k[φ(k + 1)− φ(k)].
The pruned first price set system auction problem associated with P(k) is con-
structed by deleting all the columns which are not used in the optimal solution of
P(k + 1). Specifically, let x¯ be the optimal solution of P(k + 1) (we assume it is
unique), and let J = {j | x¯j = 1}. Then, the pruned first price set system auction
problem is defined as:
P˜(k) : φ˜(k) = min c˜x˜
subject to A˜x˜ = kb, 0 ≤ x˜ ≤ 1
where c˜ = cJ , A˜ = AJ , and x˜ is a |J1| column vector.
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We denote by µ˜(k) the optimal objective function of the max benchmark problem
associated with the pruned problem, P˜(k). Since the pattern of the auction’s agents’
behavior is simpler for the pruned problem than it is for the original problem, it is
hoped that the values of the associated µ(k) and µ˜(k) are close.
Indeed, for the k-flow problem, it is proved in [KSM10] that µ(k) ≥ 1
k+1 µ˜(k),
while a stronger lower bound result is proved in [CEGP10] – that µ(k) ≥ µ˜(k). In
the following theorem, we prove for the more general case of total unimodularity, the
stronger lower bound for µ(k) (as in [CEGP10]). We also provide an upper bound for
µ(k) in terms of µ˜(k).
Theorem 3.2. µ˜(k) ≤ µ(k) ≤ (k + 1)µ˜(k).
Proof.
(a) Note that φ(k + 1) = φ˜(k + 1). Secondly, since P˜(k) is a restriction of P(k),
φ(k) ≤ φ˜(k). Thus, by Theorem 3.2,
µ(k) = k[φ(k + 1)− φ(k)] ≥ k[φ(k + 1)− φ˜(k)] = µ˜(k)
This completes the proof of the lower bound.
(b) Let x¯ be a binary optimal solution to P(k + 1). By Proposition 2.1, there
exist binary x¯i, i = 1, . . . , k + 1 such that Ax¯i = b and x¯ =
∑k+1
i=1 x¯
i. Let
δ = max1≤i≤k+1 cx¯
i. Then,
µ˜(k) = k[φ(k + 1)− φ˜(k)] ≥ k[φ(k + 1)− (φ(k + 1)− δ)] = kδ.
and
kδ ≥ k
φ(k + 1)
k + 1
≥
k[φ(k + 1)− φ(k)]
k + 1
=
µ(k)
k + 1
.
3.2. The Min Benchmark Problem. Let ν(k) be the optimal value of the min
benchmark problem. Unlike the max benchmark problem, the third requirement of
the min benchmark problem (3.3), is not redundant. Moreover, it is shown in [CK07]
that the min benchmark problem for the special case of k-flow is NP-complete even
for k = 1. However, paper [CEGP10] presents a lower bound for ν(k) (for the k-flow
case). The key to this bound is a theorem, first introduced in [GC10], which is related
to a minimum cost k-flow problem with the property that removing any single edge
from the underlying network does not affect the total minimum cost. In the following
proposition, we present a simpler proof of the same theorem but in our more general
setup.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that for every j = 1, . . . , n, P(k) has a binary optimal
solution xˆj with xˆjj = 0. Then, there exist k+1 binary optimal solutions x¯
1, . . . , x¯k+1
to P(1) such that
∑k+1
i=1 x¯
i is an optimal solution to P(k + 1).
Proof. Let xˆ be a strict convex combination of all the binary optimal solutions
xˆj , j = 1, . . . , n, to P(k). Let
Jf = {j | xˆj > 0}, J0 = {j | xˆ = 0}.
By the assumption of the proposition and the definition of Jf , we have that 0 <
xˆJf < 1. Since xˆ is an optimal solution to P(k), and by Proposition 2.3, there exists
y¯ such that
y¯AJ0 ≤ cJ0 , y¯AJf = cJf .
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Moreover, Proposition 2.3 implies that for nonnegative λ,
xJ0 = 0, 0 ≤ xJf ≤ 1, AJfxJf = λb, ⇒ x is optimal for P(λ).(3.4)
Now, consider Pf(λ), the parametric LP (2.2) restricted to Jf . That is,
Pf (λ) : φf (λ) = min cfxf
subject to Afxf = 0+ λb, 0 ≤ xf ≤ 1.
(3.5)
Note that the proposition’s assumption implies that Pf (k) is monopoly-free. That is,
for every j ∈ Jf there exists a binary feasible solution x to Pf (k) with xj = 0. Thus,
applying Proposition 2.2 to Pf (k), we have that there exists a binary feasible solution
x¯Jf to Pf (k + 1). Now, let x¯ = (x¯J0 , x¯Jf ) where x¯J0 = 0. We define
x¯(λ) =
(
λ
k + 1
)
x¯.
Since x¯(λ) is feasible for P(λ) for λ ∈ [0, k + 1], and by (3.4), we have that x¯(λ)
is optimal for P(λ) for λ ∈ [0, k + 1]. So, for λ ∈ [0, k + 1],
φ(λ) = cx¯(λ) = cJf
(
λ
k + 1
)
x¯Jf =
(
λ
k + 1
)
cJf x¯Jf =
(
λ
k + 1
)
φ(k + 1).
Thus, φ(1) = 1
k+1φ(k + 1), which implies that φ(λ) = λφ(1). Finally, recalling that
x¯ = x¯(k + 1) is a binary optimal solution to P(k + 1), and by Proposition 2.1, there
exist k + 1 binary feasible solutions x¯1, . . . , x¯k+1 to P(1) such that x¯ =
∑k+1
i=1 x¯
i.
Thus,
0 = φ(k+1)−(k+1)φ(1) = cx¯−(k+1)φ(1) = c(
k+1∑
i=1
x¯i)−(k+1)φ(1) =
k+1∑
i=1
(cx¯i−φ(1))
Noting that cx¯i−φ(1) ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , k+1, and
∑k+1
i=1 (cx¯
i−φ(1)) = 0, we conclude
that for i = 1, . . . , k+1, cx¯i = φ(1). Hence, x¯i (i = 1, . . . , k+1) are optimal for P(1).
Based on Proposition 3.3, we conclude this section by proving a lower bound
for ν(k) which is a straightforward generalization of a similar bound established in
[CEGP10] for the k-flow case.
We call a set S = {x1, . . . ,xk+1} a feasible collection for P(k + 1), if for
i = 1, . . . , k + 1, xi is a binary feasible solution to P(1) and
∑k+1
i=1 x
i is a feasible
solution to P(k + 1). We define γc(S) = maxxi∈S cx
i and Γc = minS∈Ω γc(S), where
Ω denotes the set of all feasible collections S for P(k + 1).
Let z¯ be an optimal solution to the min benchmark problem. We denote by Pz¯(k)
problem P(k) where z¯ replaces c in the objective function, and by φz¯(k) the optimal
objective function value of Pz¯(k).
Theorem 3.4. ν(k) ≥ kΓc.
Proof. Let x∗ be the unique binary optimal solution to P(k). Then, by require-
ment (3.2) of the min benchmark problem, we have that x∗ is a binary optimal solution
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to Pz¯(k). However, requirement (3.3) of the min benchmark problem satisfies the as-
sumption of Proposition 3.3, with respect to Pz¯(k). Thus, there exist k + 1 binary
optimal solutions x¯1, . . . , x¯k+1 to Pz¯(1) such that
∑k+1
i=1 x¯
i is an optimal solution to
Pz¯(k + 1). It also follows, by the convexity of φ(λ), that kφz¯(k) = kφz¯(1). Thus,
noting that for i = 1, . . . , k+1, zxi = φz(1), and that (3.1) implies that for all S ∈ Ω,
γz(S) ≥ γc(S), we have
ν(k) = z¯x∗ = φz(k) = kφz¯(1) = kγz(x¯
1, . . . , x¯k+1) ≥ kγc(x¯
1, . . . , x¯k+1) ≥ kΓc.
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